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This paper studies to what extent immigrants have less access to main-
stream credit than their native counterparts. For this purpose I use a large,
unique data set with a panel of Swedish pawnshop customers. The data al-
low me to investigate to what extent pawnshop customers actively apply for
mainstream bank credit and how successful they are by comparing credit ap-
plications from immigrants and natives and the corresponding bank decisions.
I do not ￿nd that immigrants have a di⁄erent propensity to apply for main-
stream bank credit. However, I do ￿nd that banks have a lower propensity to
grant loans to immigrants from African descent compared to their Nordic-born
counterparts. Robustness tests based on data from recent immigrants only
suggest that the demand for credit varies with the duration of residence while
di⁄erences in loan-granting rates are enduring.
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11 Introduction
A central question facing researchers and policy makers is the extent to which im-
migrants will adapt to economic, social, and political life. A crucial determinant of
economic and social well-being is wealth accumulation and the access to ￿nancial
markets. While there is a rich literature that examines the sources of immigrant-
native di⁄erences in labor market, health, and educational outcomes, relatively little
is known about the determinants of di⁄erences in access to ￿nancial markets between
immigrants and the native born.
Since ￿nancial markets provide important tools for enhancing welfare ￿means to
transfer resources across time and across states of the world, to make payments,
to mitigate risk and to fund investments ￿ low rates of participation within the
mainstream ￿nancial sector and relatively more reliance on more expensive alternative
credit by immigrants are likely to be associated with lower welfare.
Previous research on immigrants and ￿nancial markets includes US studies on
immigrant holdings of checking and savings accounts (Osili and Paulson, 2006), re-
lationships with ￿nancial institutions (Osili and Paulson, 2008), and ownership of
stocks and mutual funds (Chatterjee, 2009 and Bogan and Seto, 2010). Despite a
substantial amount of anecdotal evidence that immigrants are over-represented out-
side mainstream ￿nance, there is no study, to my knowledge, that uses micro data to
analyze immigrants￿e⁄ort and ability to obtain regular bank credit.
This paper uses a unique data set that allows me to compare immigrants and
natives in their pursuit of and access to mainstream credit. More precisely, I start with
investigating the group of pawnshop customers that actively apply for mainstream
credit. For this group I study the success rate of loan applications by comparing
immigrants and Swedish-born pawnshop customers. I estimate a proportional hazard
model for immigrants in which Swedish-born pawnshop customers function as the
benchmark, to see if these di⁄erences are driven by a di⁄erent propensity to apply
for regular credit or a di⁄erent propensity for a loan application to be granted.
2From earlier research, Bos (2009) we know that the vast majority of pawnshop
customers do not try to get regular credit before they take pawn credit. For this group
I explore the possibility that immigrants￿knowledge about their own chances to obtain
regular credit di⁄ers from that of Swedish-born pawnshop customers. For this purpose
I compare the out-of-sample predicted probabilities that a group of immigrant and
Swedish-born pawnshop customers will have a ￿ctional loan application accepted.
The data set contains 135,036 pawnshop customers, of whom 41,996 are foreign
born, and 17,554 are second-generation immigrants. Everyone is followed at a bi-
monthly frequency over the period 2000 - 2005. The data include all registered infor-
mation that pawnbrokers and the national credit bureau Upplysningscentralen AB
(UC) have on these individuals. For the purpose of this study I gathered additional
information from Statistics Sweden (SCB) that enables me to identify the region of
origin, date of arrival in Sweden for all customers and their parents.
In Sweden pawn credit is regularly used by four percent of the Swedish adult pop-
ulation. I ￿nd that immigrants are over-represented among pawn credit customers:
31 percent of them are immigrants compared to 14 percent in the Swedish population.
In addition immigrants are six percent less likely to be accepted when applying for
mainstream credit, relative to their Swedish-born counterparts. This holds in par-
ticular for immigrants of African descent, who are 15 percent less likely. This e⁄ect
disappears for second-generation immigrants with African parents. I don￿ t ￿nd that
immigrants have a di⁄erent propensity to apply for mainstream credit, but I do ￿nd
a lower propensity for loan granting compared to their Swedish-born counterparts.
Among the group pawnshop customers who do not apply for a loan at main-
stream banks before taking a pawn loan, the discouraged borrowers. I ￿nd evidence
that merely ￿ve percent of the ￿rst- and only four percent of the second-generation
immigrants would have had a loan application granted had they applied. This sug-
gests that immigrant discouraged borrowers are at least equally well-informed about
their chances of obtaining regular credit as their Swedish-born counterparts.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brie￿ y discusses
the existing literature, Section 3 describes the data and presents some descriptive
statistics, Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, Section 5 looks at the discouraged
borrowers and Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Background
Osili and Paulson (2006) ￿nd that immigrants in the US have a lower rate of ownership
of ￿nancial assets such as checking and savings accounts. This persists even for
immigrants who have lived in the United States for many years. Osili and Paulson
(2008) also ￿nd that immigrants from countries with ￿nancial institutions of higher
quality are more likely to use formal ￿nancial markets and to have a relationship with
a bank after their move to the United States.
Chatterjee (2009) ￿nds that immigrant Americans in the US are less likely to
own ￿nancial assets such as stocks and mutual funds compared to natives, though he
suggests that participation increases as the length of their stay in the United States
increases. For both immigrants and natives, Chatterjee (2009) also concludes that
risk tolerance is a positive predictor of ￿nancial market participation. Bogan and Seto
(2010) decompose the immigrant population by country of origin and ￿nd that there
is a signi￿cant variation in the rates of asset holdings by the immigrants￿country of
origin. Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002) examine bank market structure
to draw inferences concerning the role of discrimination in credit markets for small
businesses. In this paper they ￿nd that white men and women can expect similar
treatment in credit markets, with some bene￿ts to female-owned ￿rms located in
concentrated banking markets. Minorities, by contrast, fare worse than whites. Cav-
alluzzo and Wolken (2005) examine the impact of personal wealth on small business
loan turndowns across demographic groups. They ￿nd substantial unexplained di⁄er-
ences in denial rates between African-American-, Hispanic-, Asian-, and white-owned
4￿rms.
3 Data
The data set used in this study consists of a representative sample of Swedish pawn-
shop customers. It consists of 200,313 unique individuals and the individuals are
observed at a bimonthly frequency from February 2000 until October 2005. The data
stem from three administrative sources, (i) the pawnbrokers, (ii) the credit bureau
and (iii) Statistics Sweden. The pawnbrokers that supplied their data account for
70 percent of the annual pawn loan volume in Sweden. They provided all registered
information on their pawnshop customers. The credit bureau, upplysningscentralen
(UC) and Statistics Sweden (SCB) supplemented these data with their information
by exploiting the unique personal number that each resident of Sweden has. Before
handing over the combined data for analysis the personal numbers were removed.1
SCB variables identify the country of origin, of both the pawnshop customers and
their parents, their arrival date, their highest educational obtainment, and their fam-
ily build up. The data set provides a detailed look at the pawnshop customers-their
immigrant status and their use of credit both at the regular bank and at the pawn-
shop. In this study I focus on the individuals that use pawn credit in sample, which
is a total of 135,036 individuals.
In order to compare the proportion of ￿rst- and second-generation immigrants with
the Swedish population, SCB drew a random sample from the Swedish population for
the same years as the panel. This random sample consist of 1.2 million individuals
18 years or older. For this random sample SCB supplied the same information on
immigrant status.
This combined data set is well suited for the purpose of this study for several
1The pawnshop federation supplied the personal numbers of their customers starting in 1980
which enabled the credit bureau to exclude these individuals in the control group.
5reasons. First, it has comprehensive information on the region of origin of both the
pawnshop customers and their parents. Second, the credit bureau data enable me
to control for creditworthiness and other personal characteristics relevant within the
regular ￿nancial system. Third, the data allow me to observe both loan applications at
mainstream banks and these banks￿decision to reject or grant the application. Last,
exact information is available on the timing of any pawn loan that is subsequently
taken by the individual. Together this allows me to analyze whether immigrant
pawnshop customers have less access to mainstream credit than their Swedish-born
counterparts.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
In this section I describe the over- and under-representation of immigrant groups
by comparing the distributions of the pawnshop customers with the random sample
taken from Swedish society for the years 2000-05.
3.1.1 First-generation immigrants: region of birth
Table 1 provides the distribution of ￿rst-generation immigrants over their country
of birth present in the pawnshop sample and the sample of the Swedish population.
There is a over-representation of ￿rst-generation immigrants. Among the pawnshop
customers 31 percent are immigrants compared to 14 percent in the Swedish popula-
tion.
As one might expect, this over-representation is mostly driven by non-Western
born immigrants, since one can assume that on average it is easier for immigrants
born in Europe and North America to integrate into Swedish society. The over-
representation is the highest among immigrants born in Africa. Again this di⁄erence
is more than double. with 13.8 percent within the pawnshop customers and 5.5
percent in the Swedish population. Second is the over-representation of immigrants
born in South America and third, immigrants born in Asia.
63.1.2 Second-generation immigrants: parents￿region of birth
A second-generation immigrant is born in Sweden but has one or both parents who
were born outside Sweden. Tables 2 and 3 respectively present the distribution over
the parents￿region of birth for ￿rst-, second-generation immigrants who have one
and both parents born abroad
Again, second-generation immigrants in general are over-represented among the
pawnshop customers but not as much as the ￿rst-generation immigrants. Of the
Swedish population in this period (2000-05) around 10 percent were second-generation
immigrants and among the pawnshop customers this number is 13 percent.
One parent born abroad As shown in Table 2, in both the Swedish population
and the pawnshop sample it is slightly more common to ￿nd the combination of a
mother born abroad with a father born in Sweden: 60 percent in the pawnshop sample
and 57 percent in the Swedish population.
When it is the mother who is born abroad, it is the mothers born in Nordic
countries excluding Sweden and the EU25 group that are over-represented. For the
children with a father born abroad and a mother born in Sweden, there is an over-
representation of pawnshop customers with a father born in Africa, Asia and the six
European countries that are not included in the EU25 or the Nordic group.
Both parents born abroad There are slightly more pawnshop customers whose
parents are both born abroad than is prevalent in the Swedish population: 5.1 com-
pared to 4.1 percent (see Table 3). When both parents were born abroad, it is most
likely that both parents were born in the same region. Within the pawnshop cus-
tomers this is the case 85 percent of the time and 90 percent within the Swedish
population. In both populations the parents are most likely both born in Nordic
countries, the EU10 or the rest of Europe. These three regions are slightly over-
represented within the pawnshop customer group plus Africa.
74 Empirical analysis
In order to get a better understanding of the factors that have led to the over-
representation of immigrants among the pawnshop customers, I will ￿rst see if there
is a di⁄erence in the acceptance frequency of loan applications by mainstream banks,
the so-called success ratio, of immigrants and Swedish-born pawnshop customers.
In order to avoid having the outcomes in￿ uenced by di⁄erences in creditworthiness
between the two groups, I use propensity score matching to select from the sample
of Swedish-born pawnshop customers those that are most similar from a creditwor-
thiness perspective. Second, with a Cox proportional hazard model I look to see if
these di⁄erences in acceptance ratios between the groups are driven by di⁄erences
in propensities to apply for a loan or loan acceptance. Since the latter results are
evaluated from the ￿rst pawn loan the individual takes in the sample, I take a sep-
arate look at the group of immigrants that immigrated in sample to see if and how
much the results alter. The advantage of this immigrated in-sample group is that
we can be sure we observe their actual ￿rst loan application and granting in Swe-
den. The drawback is that we loose the parallel with the Swedish-born pawnshop
customers. Instead this group is compared with the Nordic-born immigrants that
similarly immigrated in-sample. The ￿nal analysis focuses on the group of pawnshop
customers that did not apply for a mainstream bank loan before they took pawn
credit, the so-called discouraged borrowers. For this group I explore the possibility
that immigrants￿knowledge about their own chances to obtain regular credit di⁄ers
from that of the Swedish-born pawnshop customers. To do this I compare the out-of-
sample predicted probabilities that a ￿ctional loan application will be accepted at
a mainstream bank for immigrants and for Swedish-born pawnshop customers given
their characteristics. This prediction is based on a probit model describing the bank￿ s
decision to grant a loan, or not, estimated on a representative sample of the whole
Swedish population.
84.1 Obtaining regular credit
The question I investigate is whether there is a di⁄erence in the likelihood of obtaining
regular credit for immigrant and non-immigrant pawnshop customers while control-
ling for creditworthiness. I check if there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the number of
loans granted as a share of loan applications between the immigrant groups k and
its non-immigrant counterpart. To select individuals from the non-immigrant group
that are similar to the individuals in the respective immigrant group. I will make use
of propensity score matching; see Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
4.1.1 Common support
Following Leuven and Sianesi (2003) I estimate a probit model for the immigrant
group2
IK = b0 + b1Agei + b2Malei + b3bigcity + b4incomei;y + b5capinc + ::
b6House_valuei;yc + b7zerolimi;y + b8claimsi;y + :b9zero_crdt_rmrki;y + ::
b10Balance_inci;y + b11good_scorei;y + ";
where the dependent variable IK is the immigrant group dummy, with k = first￿;second￿
generation and the explanatory variables (the variables for which we want the non-
immigrants to be more similar) are de￿ned in Table 4; it contains all variables that are
most relevant for the decision by a mainstream bank to grant a loan, or not; see Bos
(2009). These variables are evaluated at year y with y = 2000;2001;::;:2005. I ￿t the
model for the sample that includes both immigrant group k and the non-immigrant
group. I then use the individuals￿propensity scores, which are simply the in-sample
predicted probabilities of belonging to the immigrant group (Ik = 1) to ￿nd the
common support. The common support is the range of propensity scores of the non-
2I make use of the ￿rst part of the program: psmatch2 within Stata in order to directly obtain
the propensity score for every individual and not have to create the in sample predicted probabilities
separately.
9immigrant group that is supported by the immigrant group. For the area where the
two density functions overlap, I select only those individuals from the non-immigrant
group that have a propensity score that falls in the common support range.
Tables 5 and 6 show the di⁄erence in the mean values of the explanatory variables
for ￿rst- and second-generation immigrant pawnshop customers compared with the
Swedish-born pawnshop customers before propensity score matching. After propen-
sity score matching the ￿ bias￿was on average reduced by 83.2 percent.
4.1.2 Success ratio
The average annual success ratio is de￿ned as follows;





where Kc is the common support Swedish-born counterpart of the immigrant
group K: I will test if the di⁄erences are signi￿cant with a standard t-test. The results
are presented in Table 7. In general, the di⁄erences in success ratios between the
immigrant groups and their Swedish-born counterparts are not large, but nevertheless
signi￿cant.
4.1.3 Immigrant versus Swedish-born pawnshop customers
Table 7 contains the average success ratios of the ￿rst-generation immigrant pawnshop
customers and their common support Swedish-born counterpart. On average ￿rst-
generation immigrant pawnshop customers have a success ratio of 26.7 percent. For
Swedish-born pawnshop customers belonging to the common support, this ratio is
28.6 percent. A t-test rejects the hypothesis that these success ratios are equal.
The same result holds for second-generation immigrants unless the mother is
Swedish-born. A possible explanation for this result may be that children spend
more time with their mothers when growing up. Having a Swedish mother may be
more favorable for integration than having a Swedish father when the other parent
10is foreign born. When both parents of the pawnshop customer are foreign born the
success ratio worsens slightly to 25.1 percent and the di⁄erence between them and
the common support Swedish-born pawnshop customers consequently widens.
I also look at two groups of immigrants: those who themselves were born in Africa
and those who have at least one parent born in Africa. These two immigrant groups
are of particular interest for two reasons, First, the ￿nancial system in this region
is on average less developed. This may make it harder for immigrants to maneuver
within the Swedish ￿nancial system. Second, because of skin color members of this
group are most likely identi￿ed as non-natives. Both characteristics are expected to
be associated with lower success ratios. The results in Table 7 con￿rm this prediction
for the ￿rst-generation immigrants born in Africa. Their success ratio is the lowest of
all groups, 24.5 percent, and signi￿cantly di⁄erent. The Swedish-born counterparts
have a success ratio of 28 percent. The success ratios are more or less equal for
second-generation immigrants who have at least one parent born in Africa.
4.2 Propensity to apply for and obtain mainstream credit
In the previous section I presented evidence that suggests it is harder for immigrants
than for their Swedish-born counterparts to obtain regular bank credit. In this section
I investigate whether these di⁄erences in acceptance rates can be explained by a more
active search for bank credit, i.e., higher application rates, by immigrants rather than
by more restrictive lending.
First, I compare the propensity of ￿rst- and second-generation immigrants to apply
for regular bank credit with that of their common support Swedish-born counterparts.
Next, I compare the propensity of regular banks to grant loan applications. Both
propensities are measured by pawn loan.3 I estimate the following Cox proportional
3I ran the same regression for the following ￿ origins￿ : the starting time when individuals are
de￿nied to be at risk; (i), the second pawn loan and (ii) a randomly picked pawn loan within the
window of the panel. The results did not change signi￿cantly.
11hazard model:
log hi(t) = ￿(t) + ￿xi + "i
or equivalently
hi(t) = h0(t) + exp(￿(t) + ￿xi + "i)
Here, hi(t) is the hazard rate of individual i at time t, ￿(t) = logh0(t), and x con-
tains all the non-time-varying covariates. In the ￿rst group of regressions, displayed
in Table 8, the main variables of interest are individuals￿instantaneous probability
of applying for a regular bank loan conditional on having taken a pawn loan. In
the second panel of Table 8, I display results for the probability of obtaining a regu-
lar bank loan:Shown in Table 8, ￿rst-generation immigrants born in Africa are more
likely to apply for a regular bank loan than the Swedish-born pawnshop customer (the
benchmark).4 At the same time the probability of loan granting by regular banks is
reduced by 7 percent for immigrants born in Africa compared to the Swedish-born.
4.3 In-sample immigration
Looking at immigrants that entered Sweden before the start of my sample period
may create a bias in the above regressions. Even when I control for the length of time
immigrants are in Sweden, the ￿rst loan application observed in-sample can be the
third loan application for one individual and the twentieth for another. Since both
the propensity to apply for a loan and the propensity to be granted a loan may be
in￿ uenced by past experiences, the results may be tainted by these di⁄erences.
I will therefore take a separate look at a group of immigrants, 3,457 individuals,
that arrive in Sweden in-sample (2000-2005) to see if the results will alter. The
advantage for this group is that I can exactly observe when they apply for their ￿rst
4I tested the proportionality of the hazards by letting the ￿rst generation immigrants born in
Africa interact with time linearly. There is no evidence that the e⁄ect varies with time.
12loan at a regular bank, when their ￿rst loan application was granted and when they
took their ￿rst pawn loan in Sweden. A disadvantage is that I no longer can compare
them with their Swedish-born counterparts, since I still do not know when the latter
made their ￿rst loan application and when their ￿rst loan was granted. To resolve this
problem I instead compare non-Nordic-born immigrants with the immigrants that are
born in one of the Nordic countries, excluding Sweden. The level of development of
the Nordic countries is comparable and Nordic citizens have free movement of labor
with complete and immediate access to each other￿ s social security system. I therefore
expect Nordic-born immigrants to adopt relatively easily to Swedish society and have
participation rates that are very close to those of the native population.5 In line with
the analysis in the previous section I construct a common support and select those
immigrants from the Nordic countries that are most similar from a creditworthiness
perspective to the respective immigrants who immigrated in-sample.
Table 9 presents the percentage of immigrants who immigrated in-sample by their
region of birth. Compared to the total pawnshop sample from before, this sample
contains slightly more immigrants born in Africa and substantially more immigrants
of Asian descent. Table 10 summarizes their average credit scores at the time they are
￿rst observed in the panel. Since the credit bureau data have a bimonthly frequency
and the immigration data give an exact date, it is possible that two months have
passed before we observe them for the ￿rst time. This explains how individuals were
able to have already obtained credit: one percent has outstanding credit and, more
surprisingly, one percent have a credit remark. Interestingly 90 percent have a good
credit score when they are ￿rst observed. It is also notable that their average age is
younger than that of the average pawnshop customer.
Table 11 shows the average number of days between the entrance into Sweden
5The latter part of Table 10 presents the Nordic-born pawnshop customers that immigrated in-
sample and the Swedish born pawnshop customers, to con￿rm that both groups are indeed similar
from a creditworthiness perspective. Since the Nordic-born just arrived in Sweden, they naturally
have a lower percentage capital income, house-value and claims.
13and the immigrants￿￿rst mainstream loan application, mainstream loan granting and
pawn loan. On average it takes 467 days before the ￿rst-generation immigrants apply
for a regular bank loan, 751 days before a loan application is granted and 681 days
before the ￿rst pawn loan is taken. This average pattern suggests that ￿rst-generation
immigrants ￿rst try to get mainstream bank credit, but do not immediately succeed.
There is more than a year between applying for and obtaining mainstream credit; in
the meantime pawn credit is obtained to satisfy their credit needs.
Immigrants born in the Nordic region are the quickest to apply for a loan and
to obtain a loan. Immigrants born in Asia are the slowest in both categories, while
immigrants from one of the EU10 countries are the fastest in taking a pawn loan.
Immigrants born in Asia wait the longest before taking a pawn loan.
Table 12 displays the propensity to apply for bank credit and banks￿propensity
to grant loans for all immigrants excluding the Nordic-born (the benchmark) and for
immigrants of African descent. As mentioned above, the benchmark group is formed
by the common support immigrants from the Nordic countries excluding Sweden.
When we consider only immigrants that immigrated in-sample and compare them to
the immigrants of Nordic descent, immigrants of African descent no longer have a
higher propensity to apply for mainstream bank credit. The propensity for all im-
migrants except the Nordic-born is still not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the common
support Nordic-born counterparts. This is also true for the African-born. This un-
derminds the earlier ￿nding that immigrants from African descent are more likely
to apply for a regular bank loan. The ￿nding in the previous section that immi-
grants of African descent have a lower tendency to get loan applications approved,
however, holds for immigrants of African descent who immigrated in-sample as well.
Therefore, I conclude that the pawnshop customers of African descent face the high-
est risk of su⁄ering from a disadvantaged position within the regular credit market
compared to their Swedish-born counterparts. This e⁄ect, however, disappears for
second-generation immigrants whose parents were born in Africa.
145 Discouraged borrowers
So far, the analysis has focused on the group of pawnshop customers that actively
apply for mainstream credit to see if there is a di⁄erence in the propensity to apply for
and obtain regular credit between Swedish- and foreign-born pawnshop customers.
The vast majority of pawnshop customers, however, do not apply for mainstream
bank credit before taking pawn credit. For this group I explore the possibility that
immigrants￿knowledge about their own chances of obtaining regular credit di⁄ers
from that of the Swedish-born pawnshop customers, expressed by a di⁄erence in the
share of individuals that have a reasonable chance to obtain mainstream credit despite
the fact that they do not apply for it.
As in Bos (2009) I de￿ne these individuals to be ￿ discouraged borrowers￿and as-
sume that they do not apply for regular credit because they expect to be rejected.
The data enable me to identify discouraged borrowers, without uncertainty about
their need for credit; since I observe them taking pawn credit. Han et al. (2009)
argue that discouragement can be viewed as a self-rationing mechanism in the ap-
plication decision, implying that bad as well as good borrowers can be discouraged.
Discouragement is therefore de￿ned as e¢ cient when ￿ bad￿borrowers are discouraged
but ine¢ cient when good borrowers are discouraged or if bad borrowers get into the
loan pool.
5.1 Descriptive statistics of the discouraged borrowers
Of all pawnshop customers in the sample, 73.7 percent take pawn credit but do not
apply for regular bank credit for the 12 months preceding the date at which the
pawn loan was taken. Table 13 shows that ￿rst-generation immigrants are not over-
represented in the group of discouraged borrowers compared to the total pawnshop
customers group: Roughly 31 percent of all discouraged borrowers are ￿rst-generation
immigrants. Second-generation immigrants (Table 14) are largely over-represented,
15with 22.5 percent among the discouraged borrowers and 13 percent among the total
pawnshop customers compared to 10 percent in the total Swedish population.
5.1.1 Regions of origin
The distribution of ￿rst-generation discouraged borrowers over the regions of origin is
very similar to the total pawnshop customer group, with only somewhat more African
and fewer Asian born among the discouraged borrowers.
As mentioned above, second-generation immigrants are largely over-represented
within the group of discouraged borrowers. This over-representation stems mostly
from immigrants born in Africa, South America, and countries in Europe other than
the EU25 and Nordic countries. Most striking is the over-representation of second-
generation immigrants with a mother or father born in Asia. This group represents
a relatively small share among the total group of pawnshop customers but accounts
for 7-8 percent of the discouraged borrower group of pawnshop customers.
When both parents were born abroad, there is an extreme over-representation
of immigrants with parents who were both born in Asia, 16 percent compared to 4
percent in the total pawnshop group; see Table 15.
5.1.2 Creditworthiness
First, I brie￿ y describe the general di⁄erences in average creditworthiness among the
￿rst- and second-generation, (i) discouraged borrowers, (ii) total group of pawnshop
borrowers and (iii) Swedish-born pawnshop borrowers. Tables 16 and 17 present the
descriptive statistics of the three kinds of pawnshop customers for ￿rst- and second-
generation immigrants respectively. Among pawnshop customers, the Swedish-born
are most creditworthy; the ￿rst-generation immigrants among the total group of
pawnshop customers are not far behind while ￿rst-generation immigrant discouraged
borrowers are the least creditworthy.
As expected, ￿rst-generation immigrant discouraged borrowers more often have
16zero outstanding loans at mainstream banks, and least often have a good credit score
or no credit remarks. They are also more likely to live in a big city compared to the
other two groups of pawnshop customers. The same holds more or less for second-
generation immigrants who belong to the discouraged borrowers group. Even fewer
individuals have a good credit score, zero credit remarks, and more have outstanding
claims. The descriptive statistics thus suggest that the predicted probabilities are
lower for both the ￿rst- and the second-generation immigrant discouraged borrowers
compared to the Swedish-born discouraged borrowers.
5.1.3 Predicting loan approval
For this purpose I use the empirical model that describes the bank￿ s decision to
grant a loan application, or not, obtained in Bos (2009). The model is outlined in
appendix A and Table 18 in appendix B summarizes the estimation results based on
a representative sample of the whole Swedish population, including non-pawnshop
customers. The out-of-sample prediction to obtain regular credit for the discouraged
borrowers is based on this empirical model. In line with the analysis in Bos (2009),
I base the cut-o⁄ point on the median predicted probability of the individuals whose
loan was actually granted: a predicted probability of 0.78.
Table 18 contains the share of discouraged borrowers that have a predicted prob-
ability equal or above the cut-o⁄ point for several groups of immigrants. Overall 7.4
percent of all discouraged borrowers have a predicted probability that is larger than
0.78 to get their loan application approved.
This proportion is smaller for ￿rst- and second-generation immigrants, in partic-
ular, if they or their parents were born in Africa or Asia. Among the Swedish-born
this share is higher than that for all discouraged borrowers: 9 percent. If I exclude
those who have immigrant parents from the Swedish-born, this percentage rises to
almost 11 percent.
It is striking how well people seem to be able to predict their own chances of
17obtaining a loan at the regular bank. At most 11 percent of the Swedish-born exclud-
ing the second generation immigrants would have a predicted probability above the
cut-o⁄ point. From the perspective of Han et al. (2009) the discouragement of this
group of pawnshop customers could be viewed as e¢ cient, since the vast majority
of their loan applications would have been denied if the discouraged borrowers had
applied at regular banks.
There are a number of reasons why people would prefer pawn credit over regular
credit independent of the price di⁄erence. I will name three, but there are many
more. First, pawn credit is much faster. Leaving aside the travel time to and from
the pawnshop, one can have cash in hand within 10 minutes. Second, the decision
to grant a pawn loan is based purely on the value of the collateral so there is no
need for the borrower to hand over proof of creditworthiness, which can be viewed
as invasive and bothersome. Third, pawn credit does not bear the risk of future
exclusion from regular credit. If I, for example, judge the risk of default a priori to
be high, then defaulting on one￿ s pawn loan will be unknown to the credit bureau
and thus to any future lender. This stands in stark contrast with defaulting on a
regular loan in which case such an event will remain on the individual￿ s credit report
for three years. Therefore it is possible that the higher share of individuals with a
predicted probability of getting mainstream credit above the cut-o⁄point among the
Swedish-born discouraged borrowers is explained by a preference for pawn credit.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Participation rates of immigrants in mainstream ￿nancial markets are typically sub-
stantially lower than for natives. At the same time, immigrants tend to be over-
represented among the customers of fringe banking institutions. In Sweden, for ex-
ample, 31 percent of all pawnshop customers are immigrants compared to 14 percent
in the adult population. This over-representation is most prevalent among immi-
18grants born in Africa, South America and Asia. Second-generation immigrants are
only slightly over-represented.
Having access to credit markets is important for households￿ability to smooth
consumption. Lower participation rates in mainstream ￿nancial markets and a greater
reliance on alternative, more expensive, short-term types of credit may therefore
be associated with lower welfare. Therefore, an important question for economists
is to what extent these di⁄erences between immigrants and natives are driven by
di⁄erences in demand or by di⁄erences in the supply of credit.
This paper studies to what extent immigrants have less access to mainstream
credit than their native counterparts. For this purpose I use a large, unique data set
with a panel of Swedish pawnshop customers. The data allow me to investigate to
what extent pawnshop customers actively apply for mainstream bank credit and how
successful they are by comparing credit applications from immigrants and natives
and the corresponding bank decisions.
I ￿rst investigate the success ratios of bank credit applications for immigrants and
Swedish-born pawnshop customers while correcting for di⁄erences in backgrounds
with the aid of propensity scores. My results show that immigrants are six percent
less likely to be accepted when applying for bank credit, relative to Swedish-born.
This discrepancy is particularly large for immigrants of African descent, who are
15 percent less likely to be granted bank credit than native Swedes. For second-
generation immigrants with African parents this e⁄ect disappears.
Next, I estimate a proportional hazard model to verify if the above di⁄erences
may be driven by di⁄erent propensities to apply for mainstream bank credit or by
di⁄erent propensities to grant loan applications. I ￿nd that immigrants of African
descent have both a higher probability to apply for credit and a lower probability to
be accepted by the mainstream bank.
I do not ￿nd that immigrants have a di⁄erent propensity to apply for mainstream
bank credit. However, I do ￿nd that banks have a lower propensity to grant loans
19to immigrants from African descent compared to their Nordic-born counterparts.
Robustness tests based on data from recent immigrants only suggest that the demand
for credit varies with the duration of residence while di⁄erences in loan-granting rates
are enduring.
Interestingly, immigrant pawnshop customers that do not apply for mainstream
bank credit before they take pawn credit are found to make well-informed decisions.
By exploiting implied acceptance-rejection probabilities based on data from a repre-
sentative sample from the Swedish population, I conclude that merely ￿ve percent of
the ￿rst-generation immigrants would have had a chance to get their loan applica-
tion granted had they applied. For second-generation immigrants these odds are four
percent. These numbers suggest that discouraged borrowers with immigrant back-
grounds are at least equally well-informed about their chances of obtaining regular
credit as their Swedish-born counterparts.
These results suggest that immigrants, although they display higher activity rates
than natives, are likely to be confronted with less access to mainstream credit. This
raises a number of questions. Is it possible that higher rejection rates in credit
applications by immigrants are driven by unobserved heterogeneity? Do immigrants,
for example, lack skills that are essential in the loan application process? Or is it
possible that there are systematical di⁄erences between pawnshop customers with
immigrant and native backgrounds?
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22A Probit model: The bank￿ s decision to grant a
loan
If individual i applies for a loan, then the bank must decide whether to accept or
reject the application. Let y￿
1i represent the bank￿ s expected economic bene￿t of
granting the loan to the individual i and assume
y
￿
1i = x1i￿1 + v1i
where x1 is a vector containing characteristics of the applicant, and v1 is an
unobserved disturbance. Although y￿
1i is unobserved, the bank￿ s decision to grant a
loan is observed￿y1i takes the value one if the loan application was granted and 0 if
the application was rejected:
y1i=
￿
1 if loan granted; y￿
1i > 0
0 otherwise:
As mentioned in section 4, in order to get an unbiased result I need the estimation
results of the model that describes the decision by the regular bank to grant or
reject a loan estimated with a representative sample of the total Swedish population.
Table 18 reports the estimation results from Bos (2009).6 To make the predicted
probabilities comparable with the results in Bos (2009) I use the same group of
discouraged borrowers and match the newly obtained immigrant variables with the
discouraged borrowers through their unique identi￿cation key.
6If we would estimate the same model based only on pawnshop customers, we would over-estimate
the predicted probabilities of the discouraged borrowers later on, since we know from Bos (2006 and
2009) that the total Swedish population is more creditworthy on average than the population of
pawnshop customers.
23B Tables and Figures
Table 1
Percentage ￿rst-generation immigrants, by regions of birth




Total 1st generation 31.1 13.7 17.4
Region of birth
Nordic (min SE) 18.6 28.1 -9.4
EU 15 4.7 9.9 -5.2
EU 10 8.4 7.7 0.7
Europe 12.6 18.5 -5.9
Africa 13.8 5.5 8.2
North America 2.0 2.4 -0.4
South America 11.2 4.9 6.3
Asia 28.0 22.1 5.9
Oceania 0.1 0.3 -0.2
Soviet Union 0.7 0.7 0.0
Number of individuals 41,996 16,440
24Table 2
Percentage second-generation immigrants, by regions of birth
Pawnshop customers versus the Swedish population




Total 2nd generation 13.0 10.1 2.9
Total one parent foreign born 7.9 5.8 2.1
Region of birth mother 3.8 3.4 0.4
Nordic (min SE) 66.9 62.1 4.8
EU 15 14.1 13.4 0.7
EU 10 9.0 8.9 0.1
Europe 2.3 3.9 -1.6
Africa 0.9 1.5 -0.6
North America 2.7 3.4 -0.7
South America 1.4 1.8 -0.4
Asia 1.7 3.8 -2.1
Oceania 0.1 0.1 0.0
Soviet Union 0.9 1.2 -0.2
Region of birth father 4.1 2.4 1.7
Nordic (min SE) 38.1 45.5 -7.4
EU 15 24.8 24.0 0.8
EU 10 9.5 9.8 -0.3
Europe 9.3 6.2 3.2
Africa 6.8 3.6 3.2
North America 3.6 4.9 -1.3
South America 2.3 1.5 0.8
Asia 4.6 3.4 1.2
Oceania 0.2 0.1 0.1
Soviet Union 0.8 1.2 -0.4
Number of individuals 17,555 121,200
25Table 3
Percentage second-generation immigrants, by regions of birth
Pawnshop customers versus the Swedish population




Total 2nd generation 13.0 10.1 2.9
Total both parents foreign born 5.1 4.1 1.0
Total both parents born in same foreign region 84.7 90.1 -5.4
Region of birth both parents
Nordic (min SE) 47.1 44.6 2.5
EU 15 7.5 7.1 0.4
EU 10 10.1 7.5 2.5
Europe 24.3 20.6 3.7
Africa 2.7 2.0 0.7
North America 0.0 0.2 -0.2
South America 3.8 4.2 -0.4
Asia 4.3 13.1 -8.8
Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.0
Soviet Union 0.3 0.7 -0.4
Total both parents born not same foreign region 15.3 9.9 5.4
Region of birth mother
Nordic (min SE) 48.4 41.7 6.8
EU 15 14.0 18.8 -4.9
EU 10 14.78 13.3 -3.7
Europe 9.5 8.7 -6.3
Africa 2.4 1.6 -0.6
North America 1.0 2.1 1.2
South America 3.3 1.8 2.5
Asia 4.3 6.7 -6.6
Oceania 0.1 0.2 2.0
Soviet Union 2.3 5.1 -2.9
Region of birth father
Nordic (min SE) 12.1 15.1 -3.1
EU 15 25.3 24.1 1.2
EU 10 16.1 18.8 -2.8
Europe 16.6 14.2 2.4
Africa 12.1 5.9 6.2
North America 2.7 2.8 -0.2
South America 3.3 2.8 0.5
Asia 8.8 9.2 -0.5
Oceania 0.0 0.2 -0.2
Soviet Union 3.2 6.9 -3.7



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































First- generation immigrants versus Swedish-born
The mean and the standard error of the mean for the characteristics that determine the ￿ common
support￿of the immigrant and Swedish-born pawnshop customer groups. A t-test is done to test
the hypothesis whether the two means are equal.
Mean std.err mean std.err t-test*
Personal characteristics
AGE 39.43 0.01 42.92 0.01 reject
MALE 0.51 0.00 0.50 0.00 reject
BIG_CITY 0.73 0.00 0.66 0.00 reject
Income
INCOME 709.75 1.77 969.72 2.15 reject
CAPINC 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.00 reject
HOUSE_VALUE 719.44 2.79 726.98 2.82 not reject
Regular bank credit history
ZEROLIM 0.51 0.00 0.40 0.00 reject
CLAIMS 0.36 0.00 0.38 0.00 reject
ZERO_CRDT_RMRK 0.54 0.00 0.52 0.00 reject
BALANCE_INC** 0.68 0.04 0.60 0.02 weak reject
GOOD_SCORE 0.42 0.00 0.43 0.00 weak reject








Second generation immigrants versus Swedish-born not second
generation
The mean and the standard error of the mean for the characteristics that determine the ￿ common
support￿of the immigrant and Swedish-born pawnshop customers groups. A t-test is done to test
the hypothesis whether the two means are equal.
Mean std.err mean std.err t-test*
Personal characteristics
AGE 33.10 0.01 45.20 0.01 reject
MALE 0.54 0.00 0.49 0.00 reject
BIG_CITY 0.70 0.00 0.65 0.00 reject
Income
INCOME 782.55 4.59 1012.84 2.43 reject
CAPINC 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00 reject
HOUSE_VALUE 737.47 5.26 725.59 3.12 not reject
Regular bank credit history
ZEROLIM 0.51 0.00 0.38 0.00 reject
CLAIMS 0.39 0.00 0.38 0.00 reject
ZERO_CRDT_RMRK 0.51 0.00 0.52 0.00 reject
BALANCE_INC** 0.56 0.03 0.61 0.03 weak reject
GOOD_SCORE 0.39 0.00 0.43 0.00 reject
* for the H0: mean (immigrants) - mean (Swedish born) == 0
Pawnshop cust. Pawnshop cust.
Second-gen. Immigrants Swedish-born (not 2nd-gen)
29Table 7
Average ￿ success ratios￿for immigrants and Swedish-born pawnshop
customers
The average ￿ Success ratio￿is de￿ned as:
average Succes RatioK and Kc;Y =
P
loan grantingi;y P
loan applicationsi;y where Kc is the common support
Swedish-born counterpart of the immigrant group K. The t-statistic is reported in column 3 for
the H0 : Average(succes ratioimm) ￿ Average(succes ratioSwedish) = 0
Average No. Indiv.
Success ratio std. err.  t-stat* Common supp.
First-generation immigrant
groups Immigrant 0.266 0.000 33,868
Swedish born 0.283 0.001 73,569
difference 0.017 0.001 20.7, reject H0
Second-generation immigrant
groups Immigrant 0.267 0.000 17,427
Swedish born 0.281 0.001 72,806
difference 0.014 0.001 12.4 , reject H0
Second-generation only father foreign born
groups Immigrant 0.281 0.002 5,089
Swedish born 0.280 0.003 72,803
difference 0.002 0.001 0.97, not reject H0
Second-generation only mother foreign born
groups Immigrant 0.273 0.002 5,463
Swedish born 0.273 0.000 72,800
difference 0.007 0.002 3.359, reject H0
Second-generation both parents foreign born
groups Immigrant 0.251 0.002 6,875
Swedish born 0.281 0.000 71,805
difference 0.029 0.002 17.05, reject H0
First-generation immigrants born in Africa
groups Immigrant 0.243 0.002 4,650
Swedish born 0.280 0.000 70,296
difference 0.037 0.002 18.24, reject H0
Second-generation immigrants both parents, at least one born in Africa
groups Immigrant 0.247 0.005 550
Swedish born 0.284 0.000 70,764
difference 0.037 0.005 7.07, reject H0
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Percentage pawnshop customers that immigrated to Sweden in sample





Total 1st generation 100.0 31.1 13.7
Region of birth
Nordic (min SE) 5.2 18.6 28.1
EU 15 3.1 4.7 9.9
EU 10 6.3 8.4 7.7
Europe 13.1 12.6 18.5
Africa 17.8 13.8 5.5
North America 3.1 2.0 2.4
South America 8.5 11.2 4.9
Asia 42.9 28.0 22.1
Oceania 0.1 0.1 0.3
Soviet Union 0.7 0.7

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average duration, in days
First: loan application, loan granting, pawn loan
Pawnshop customers that immigrated to Sweden in sample
by regions of birth
mean st dev min max obs
Total 495.0 467.0 0 2,071 2,561
Region of birth
Nordic (min SE) 312.0 366.5 0 1,826 141
EU 15 454.4 427.6 0 1,947 88
EU 10 498.0 466.9 0 2,071 146
Europe 503.0 457.1 0 1,889 329
Africa 459.2 429.9 0 2,071 440
North America 401.1 389.8 0 1,704 88
South America 354.2 363.6 0 1,642 256
Asia 576.4 509.7 0 2,071 1,068
Total 751.4 505.2 0 2,071 1,479
Region of birth
Nordic (min SE) 389.0 425.2 0 1,826 71
EU 15 539.3 391.5 0 1,765 57
EU 10 678.0 475.8 0 1,886 78
Europe 770.6 499.9 0 1,889 160
Africa 789.7 504.4 0 2,071 249
North America 510.6 387.2 0 1,947 59
South America 580.5 429.8 0 1,765 197
Asia 878.3 511.7 0 2,071 625
Total 681.0 552.3 0 2,096 3,457
Region of birth
Nordic (min SE) 477.8 640.6 0 1,875 1,875
EU 15 551.1 583.8 0 1,845 106
EU 10 452.5 477.7 0 1,845 216
Europe 645.1 514.4 0 2,073 451
Africa 684.3 525.7 0 2,050 616
North America 588.3 555.0 0 1,805 107
South America 550.5 529.9 0 1,990 292
Asia 790.4 547.8 0 2,096 1,484
Average duration first loan application
Average duration firs loan granting
Average duration firs pawn loan
34Table 12
Cox proportional hazard model
Propensities to apply for a loan and loan granting
Immigrants compared to Nordic-born pawnshop customers that
immigrated in-sample
The Nordic-born pawnshop customers form the baseline hazard. Hazard ratios are reported, with
standard errors in italics below, for the propensity ￿rst, to apply for a loan at a mainstream bank
and second, loan granting by the mainstream bank. These propensities are measured from the
time the individuals enter Sweden. *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels
respectively.
All, but Nordic 0.81 0.97
0.13 0.24
African born 0.95 0.85 ***
0.07 0.05
Number of subjects 52,565 794 4,518 794
Number of failures 4,518 581 1,967 320
Loglikelihood -8120.60 -3494.20 -4802.00 -1980.5
 Loan granting   Loan application
35Table 13





Total 1st generation 31.7 31.1 13.7
Region of birth
Nordic (min SE) 21.1 18.6 28.1
EU 15 4.8 4.7 9.9
EU 10 9.4 8.4 7.7
Europe 12.2 12.6 18.5
Africa 14.5 13.8 5.5
North America 2.0 2.0 2.4
South America 10.7 11.2 4.9
Asia 24.5 28.0 22.1
Oceania 0.0 0.1 0.3
Soviet Union 0.7 0.7 0.7
Number of individuals 9,379 41,996 16,440
36Table 14
Percentage second-generation immigrants, by regions of birth
Discouraged borrowers




Total 2nd generation 22.5 13.0 10.1
Total one parent foreign born 10.8 7.9 5.8
Region of birth mother 6.4 3.8 3.4
Nordic (min SE) 54.0 66.9 62.1
EU 15 7.6 14.1 13.4
EU 10 10.3 9.0 8.9
Europe 5.1 2.3 3.9
Africa 5.7 0.9 1.5
North America 2.3 2.7 3.4
South America 5.5 1.4 1.8
Asia 8.5 1.7 3.8
Oceania . 0.1 0.1
Soviet Union 1.1 0.9 1.2
Region of birth father 4.4 4.1 2.4
Nordic (min SE) 34.5 38.1 45.5
EU 15 21.4 24.8 24.0
EU 10 9.7 9.5 9.8
Europe 10.91 9.3 6.2
Africa 9.2 6.8 3.6
North America 3.4 3.6 4.9
South America 3.4 2.3 1.5
Asia 7.0 4.6 3.4
Oceania 0.2 0.2 0.1
Soviet Union 0.5 0.8 1.2
Number of individuals 6,657 17,555 121,200
37Table 15
Percentage second-generation immigrants, by regions of birth
Discouraged borrowers




Total 2nd generation 22.5 13.0 10.1
Total both parents foreign born 11.5 5.1 4.1
Total both parents born in same foreign region 90.6 84.7 90.1
Region of birth both parents
Nordic (min SE) 34.3 47.1 44.6
EU 15 4.5 7.5 7.1
EU 10 10.1 10.1 7.5
Europe 21.0 24.3 20.6
Africa 4.0 2.7 2.0
North America 0.2 0.0 0.2
South America 9.0 3.8 4.2
Asia 16.2 4.3 13.1
Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.0
Soviet Union 0.7 0.3 0.7
Total both parents born not same foreign region 9.4 15.3 9.9
Region of birth mother
Nordic (min SE) 43.0 48.4 41.7
EU 15 15.7 14.0 18.8
EU 10 13.2 14.78 13.3
Europe 11.0 9.5 8.7
Africa 2.8 2.4 1.6
North America 0.0 1.0 2.1
South America 2.2 3.3 1.8
Asia 6.3 4.3 6.7
Oceania 0.0 0.1 0.2
Soviet Union 6.0 2.3 5.1
Region of birth father
Nordic (min SE) 5.0 12.1 15.1
EU 15 18.8 25.3 24.1
EU 10 18.8 16.1 18.8
Europe 19.4 16.6 14.2
Africa 9.4 12.1 5.9
North America 3.1 2.7 2.8
South America 4.7 3.3 2.8
Asia 14.4 8.8 9.2
Oceania 0.3 0.0 0.2
Soviet Union 6.0 3.2 6.9
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The decision by the regular bank to grant a loan or not
The probit model described in appendix A. The dependent variable is the dummy variable that is
equal to one if the individual￿ s loan application was granted. This model is estimated on a
representative sample of the whole Swedish population, including non-pawnshop customers. *, **
and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels respectively.
Variables P (REG_LOAN=1)
Coeff. std.dev
CONSTANT 0.17 0.03 ***
Personal characteristics
AGE_18_35
AGE_36_65 0.04 0.01 ***
AGE_66_99 0.15 0.03 ***
MALE - 0.05 0.01 ***
RECENT_ALONE 0.02 0.02
BIGCITY - 0.06 0.01 ***
Income
ENTREPR 0.02 0.02
log(INCOME) 0.06 0.02 ***
CAPINC 0.04 0.02 **
log (HOUSE_VALUE) 0.01 0.01 **
Regular bank credit history
CUM_LOAN_DENIED - 0.54 0.01 ***
ZEROLIM - 0.80 0.02 ***
BALANCE_INC - 0.04 0.01 ***
NR_TOTAL_CRDT - 0.01 0.01
CUM_FINAN_QST 0.12 0.00 ***
BOTH_HIGH_UTIL - 0.26 0.04 ***
CLAIMS - 0.14 0.02 ***
ZERO_CRDT_RMRK 0.31 0.03 ***
GOOD_SCORE 0.29 0.02 ***
41Table 19
Out-of-sample predicted probabilities
A loan application by discouraged borrowers would be granted
The out-of-sample prediction that the discouraged borrowers will obtain regular credit is based on
the empirical model outlined in Appendix A, the bank￿ s decision to grant a loan or not, where the
estimation results, summarized in Table 18, are based on a representative sample of the Swedish
population, including non-pawnshop customers. The cut-o⁄ point is based on the median predicted
probability of the individuals whose loan was actually granted: a predicted probability of 0.78
Percentage of individuals Number of
predicted probability individuals
 > 0.78
Granted Total 50.00 34,949
Discouraged borrowers Total 7.40 29,587
Swedish-born Total 9.73 20,222
excluding 2nd-gen 10.86 16,563
First-generation immigrants Total 5.30 9,373
Africa 4.49 1,358
Second-generation immigrants Total 3.83 6,649
One parent foreign born Total 4.60 3,194
Africa 3.07 228
Asia 4.36 252
Both parents foreign born Total 2.98 3,385
Africa 3.08 162
Asia 2.13 563
42